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Abstract The relationship between place and remembering has been a 
longstanding matter of phenomenological concern. The role of the ‘lived body’ in 
mediating acts of remembering in context is clearly crucial. In this paper we 
contribute to an ‘expanded view of memory’ by describing how remembering 
difficult or problematic events – ‘vital memories’ – draws upon inter-subjective 
and inter-objective relations. We discuss two conceptual tools that provide an 
analytic framework – the concept of ‘life space’ drawn from Kurt Lewin (1932) 
and the idea of the ‘setting specificity’ of remembering. From this perspective we 
can see that the ‘lived body’ does not constitute a singular unity but rather a 
‘plurality’ of potential bodies that have ‘operative solidarity’ (cf. Simondon, 
2009) with the material relations in which they are constituted. Drawing on the 
work of Eduardo de Viveiros de Castro, we argue that ‘body memories’ need to 
be analysed from within the embodied material-relational perspective wherein 
they are afforded. 
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Introduction: Place, memory and the body 
 
Autobiographical remembering is the process of mobilising recollections of 
personally experienced past episodes within the present, to some purpose. We 
understand this as a form of social action – an interactional accomplishment that 
attempts to influence or alter the ongoing flow of events (Brown & Reavey, 
2018). As such, the context in which autobiographical remembering is 
performed is crucial. Whilst it has been recognised for some time that there is a 
need to analyse specific acts of remembering within the discursively mediated 
interactions in which they are occasioned (see Middleton & Edwards, 1990; 
Middleton & Brown, 2005), the contextual features involved are far broader. 
Remembering occurs in a specific place, which constitutes a locus of embodied 
relations and feelings. What is recollected in autobiographical memories invokes 
past places and situated experiences, whose features become expressed as part 
of the felt present moment. Memory is rendered live through this folding 
together of past and present material relations and spaces, with the body acting 
as the fulcrum around which this is accomplished. 
 
The embodied and emplaced aspects of memory have received considerable 
phenomenological attention. Edward Casey’s work (1998; 2000) offers a 
comprehensive account of the manner in which bodies are both immersed 
within and enveloped by place. If, as he puts it, the body has ‘its own ways of 
remembering’ (Casey, 2000: 147), then inevitably these modalities of body 
memory will be shaped by place. Thomas Fuchs (2012) has developed an 
account of how embodied ‘situational memories’ are stored as intermodal 
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impressions, which enter into the habitual structure of the lived body. In both 
cases, the body is presented as a means of preserving and transmitting past 
experience through the shaping of corporeal dispositions. This renders the body 
as ‘historically formed’, a ‘carrier of our life history’, which enables a ‘procedural 
field of possibilites’ shaped by past experience, to be enacted in the present 
(Fuchs, 2012: 20). The value of such an approach is clear. It allows problematic 
dualisms between mind and body, and between explicit and implicit memory, to 
be transcended, and also provides for a more dynamic conception of 
remembering as entering directly into our embodied engagement with the 
world, rather than lodged predominantly within a narrowly defined cognitive 
system. But it also concentrates our focus on the body itself rather than the 
relational field that it occupies, both in the act of remembering and in the past 
experiences that are re-articulated. If, as Gilbert Simondon and Gilles Deleuze 
have claimed, our bodies cannot be adequately understood outside of the 
networks of relations that constitute our ‘milieus’ of living, then how can these 
relations to others, to things, and to place itself, be considered in remembering 
as more than just ‘extracts’ that are stored with the lived body? 
  
To briefly illustrate the problem – in a study of how adoptive parents manage the 
memories of their adoptive children (Brookfield et al, 2008; Brown et al, 2013), a 
key issue articulated by participants was that of holding together the embodied 
relations that make up the new family unit. The identity of the adoptive family 
depends on accomplishing a felt sense of belonging, whilst acknowledging the 
unique, but often problematic, personal history of the adoptive child. The work 
of producing identity is enacted through routine negotiation around embodied 
matters such as food preferences, choice of clothes, the toys and objects the child 
plays with and so on. Persons and objects together constitute what Simondon 
(1992) calls a ‘living ensemble’ engaged in the project of becoming a family. But 
various components of this ensemble fold in other past relationships. Childhood 
photographs, for example, can contain visible signs of neglect by biological 
parents. Toys that have accompanied the child on their journey through the care 
system are links to previous carers, and reflect their presence along with traces 
of past places in the new family home. Managing how the child relates to these 
everyday objects becomes the means by which adoptive parents accommodate 
the past, with all its associated problems, as well as weave together a collective 
future. Conversely, in cases where adoption breaks down, adopted children often 
abandon or get rid of clothes and other ‘stuff’ brought by their adoptive parents, 
breaking the material links that mark out their place within the family. 
 
We would say that it is the ‘living ensemble’ rather than individual family 
members that does the work of remembering; this would be the unit of analysis. 
Such work is done through an ongoing co-ordination of bodies and objects, 
which, whilst primarily grounded in a specific place (i.e. the family home), 
inevitably spills out and becomes entangled with other relations and places (e.g. 
former carers, past ‘homes’), some of which are temporally remote, but 
experientially close (e.g. a sense of where the child really comes from/belongs). 
Our concern is with the relational-material field, which here includes objects and 
features of place, and how it informs and is informed by remembering. What we 
wish to develop is an approach that treats the body not as a singular constituted 
 3 
entity that carries memory forward, but instead as mediating between a plurality 
of living ensembles that are linked across time and space through embodied 
inter-subjective and inter-objective relations. In this paper we advance our 
argument by dwelling on the core conceptual elements that make up a relation-
material approach. We begin by summarising the notion of ‘vital memory’ that is 
central to the way we consider memories of ‘difficult’ or ‘problematic’ events and 
their place in autobiographical remembering. We will then proceed to map out 
some of the key terms such as ‘life space’ and ‘setting specificity’ which enable an 
‘expanded view of memory’, before turning to focus on the relational aspects of 
embodiment as they are mediated through inter-subjective and inter-objective 
bodily extensions. This will bring us towards the critical idea, emanating from 
contemporary anthropological work of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, that 
embodiment refers to a plurality rather than a unity of experience.  
 
Vital Memory 
 
Over the course of roughly fifteen years worth of research with groups who 
experience difficulties in relation to specific life events, we have developed the 
term ‘vital memory’ to refer to remembering difficult or traumatic events (see 
Brown & Reavey, 2015a, 2015b). Vital memory, as we see it, is a subset of 
autobiographical memory, being the range of personal episodic memories that 
inform our current sense of self and future projects (Conway, 2005). A great 
many approaches to remembering troubling events operate with a ‘deficit 
model’, where such memories are seen to be debilitating or corrosive to self. At 
the extreme end of this sits the ‘trauma theory’ that was developed following 
Cathy Caruth’s (1996) work, where the unbearable nature past suffering places it 
beyond representation in such a way that remembering can only proceed 
indirectly and often analogically. By contrast, the majority of the participants we 
have worked with are ordinary people doing their best to live with an incredibly 
difficult past. We have sought to focus on their capacities to act and the strategies 
they have evolved in the course of doing so, rather than treat traumatic events as 
an inevitable source of pathology.  
 
A key feature of vital memories is their irreversibility. The past cannot be 
undone. It becomes a ‘chreod’ in the flow of experience, a contingent event that 
lends direction to the life that follows. In this sense, difficult events, such as 
experiencing sexual or physical violence, become threaded into the life of the 
person. Whilst memories of such events may not always be relevant to making 
sense of the person’s life, they remain what Frances Cherry (1990), in a very 
different context, referred to as ‘stubborn particulars’ – specific details grounded 
in history and place that refuse erasure. But although irreversible, this does not 
prevent these events from being continuously revisited in different ways. From a 
Bergsonian perspective, temporal experience – duration – is indivisible (Bergson, 
1991; 1992). There is no break between a nominal present and some aspect of 
the past. All of our experience can be folded back on itself to form complex 
topological figures that defy ready chronological structuring. Going upstream in 
the flow of experience creates different perspectives on the contingencies of 
what may yet emerge downstream (i.e. our future).  
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There are nevertheless strong normative constraints involved in recollecting 
difficult events. These range from cultural expectations around the meaning and 
significance of ‘victimhood’ and ‘surviving’, such as are found around sexual 
abuse and violence, to norms around how suffering and distress can be narrated. 
Those who have been caught up in traumatic events can find that there is no 
audience who wants to hear (and thus act as witness to) their story, or, 
conversely, in the case of survivors of political violence, that their story is no 
longer their own, but has been co-constructed and publicized across media and 
public debates (see Brown et al, 2016 on the survivors of the 2005 London 
Bombings). Whilst to a certain extent all experience is relationally constituted, in 
that what we feel and understand about ourselves is shaped through our 
interactions with others, to lose control over the narrative of one’s own distress 
significantly adds to the difficulty of managing a difficult past.  
 
Vital memories are always about distinct places and are recalled in particular 
contemporary spaces. This doubling or folding together of past and current 
places constitutes a unique relationship. As Reavey (2010) shows in the case of 
autobiographical writing on childhood sexual abuse, the spaces which are 
remembered seem to ‘in-form’ – in the literal sense of lending their form to and 
marking out – the spaces wherein recollection occurs. The spatial organization 
that is present in difficult memories does more than simply heighten their vivid 
nature. The features of remembered place, along with the objects contained 
within them, distribute matters of accountability and agency. For example, one 
survivor of child sexual abuse recounted a scene where her brother abused her 
in a locked bedroom (see Reavey & Brown, 2009). The woman struggled with a 
wish to account for her brother’s past actions as immature and irresponsible 
curiosity. However, in a crucial detail, she described how the brother had 
deliberately removed the door handle, making it impossible for the door to be 
opened. For her, the act of locking the door and absent handle rendered the 
moral order concrete – this could only really be seen as an intentional and 
considered act. The spatial arrangement of the sister/door/brother defined the 
relational possibilities present in the experience. 
 
We view memory as inextricably linked to affect. There are many competing 
definitions and theoretical workings-up of this polyvalent term. Our preferred 
one is to view affect as a felt engagement with the relational possibilities of the 
milieu in which we currently act. This can be illustrated most simply by the 
example Deleuze (1988) attributes to Jakob von Uexhüll1. A tick living in a forest 
has a semiotic milieu or umwelt that is effectively defined by three dimensions – 
locomotion towards light, dropping onto passing animals in response to smell 
and biting at the warmest part of the body. Deleuze calls each dimension a 
distinct affect, a mode of engagement that composes ‘the world of the tick’. As 
John Shotter argued some time ago, inasmuch as we can speak of a human 
umwelt, it is infinitely more complex than that of animal worlds studied by von 
Uexhüll (Shotter and Newsom, 1982). Nevertheless, we may say that feelings 
have a primary, although obviously not exclusive, role in how we discern the 
field of possibilities in which we find ourselves at any given moment (for a fully 
developed argument see Cromby 2015). 
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Finally, remembering is at every point shadowed by forgetting. Bergson’s notion 
of the indivisibility of duration is once again helpful. As he states in The 
Perception of Change, if we accept that in some sense the past is never really 
abolished, but has a continuous, uninterrupted relation to the present then ‘we 
no longer have to explain the preservation of the past, but rather its apparent 
abolition. We shall no longer have to account for remembering, but for forgetting’ 
(1992: 153). The phrase ‘apparent abolition’ is important. If we are unable to 
ever properly excise past events from our duration, then forgetting must take the 
form of rendering that aspect of the past as not-relevant or as remote from 
current concerns. The paradoxes involved in such willful attempt at semiotic 
erasure is the subject of a playful consideration by Umberto Eco (1988), who 
concludes that hiding or re-signifying meanings within broader frames is 
required. He compares this to the practice of ‘steganography’, the practice of 
hiding information ‘in plain sight’ (see Poe’s The Purloined Letter for a famous 
literary example). What this suggests is that forgetting often takes the form of 
complexifying the accessibility of memory rather than abolishing its availability 
(Brown and Reavey, 2015a). In the case of vital memory, this is accomplished 
through a collective, relational process of managing past difficulties in a given 
setting. 
 
Life Space 
 
Having outlined the various features of vital memory, we now wish to turn to the 
conceptual tools that we draw upon to study the remembering of difficult events 
across various contexts. The body stands at the very centre of this set of concepts. 
However, as we shall come on to discuss, it is a body lacking in self-sufficient 
unity and continuity over time. It is a body viewed through the lens of process 
rather than substance metaphysics.  
 
A key analytic for us is Kurt Lewin’s concept of ‘life space’, which he defines as 
‘the totality of facts which determine the behaviour of the individual at a certain 
moment’ (1936: 12). A ‘fact’ can be understood here as a ‘sign’ that marks out a 
behavioural option or ‘possibility for action’. Such signs are arranged as a field, 
the limits of which consitute the psychological horizon of a milieu or umwelt. As 
is well known, Lewin’s advocacy of field approaches is of a piece with the Gestalt 
School’s promotion of holism and non-reductionist accounts of perception (Heft, 
2001), and prefigures the interest in dynamical systems theory within human 
development (Oyama, 2000). As early as 1936, Lewin was arguing that 
psychological processes need to be modelled as vectors through a mathematical 
space which is progressively defined through a successive number of dimensions. 
In other words, that such processes could not be dissociated from the dynamic 
field in which they occurred. The notion of the field is then simultaneously a 
mathematical tool and a means of providing a description of psychological life 
space. 
 
Life space is, Lewin asserts, topologically rather than topographically organised. 
In topographical space, distance is key to understanding relations. Proximal 
relations have greater weight than more distant relations. However, topological 
space displays the property of invariance through transformation, where the two 
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points within the boundary of the space as it undergoes structural changes (e.g. 
twisting, pleating, folding) are less important than the maintenance of their 
connection. Life space is then defined by the possibilities of movement and 
connectedness within a continuous shifting space or ‘region’ that undergoes 
transformations in its overall structural form. Relations that remain within the 
boundaries of a given region have a form of continuity. However, movements 
across the boundary represent qualitative changes that alter not only the 
possibility of movement, but also the nature of the relation itself. In 
psychological terms, a key question is discerning where the boundary of life 
space lies, on any particular occasion, and how relations and possibilities for 
action are distributed within the topologically organised space. 
 
This may appear initially appear as material-reductionist account of the 
psychological. Lewin does indeed offer many examples that are based around 
what he calls ‘physical locomotion’, where physical relations are what is crucial, 
such as the disapproving glance thrown by a mother at a child. Although note 
that since distance is of less concern that the nature of connectness, we can 
update Lewin’s example by saying there is little structural difference between 
direct presence and a disapproving text or social media update from parent to 
child. What matters in both cases are the possibilities for action that emerge. But 
here Lewin also speaks of ‘psychological locomotion’ or a ‘quasi-conceptual’ 
movement of thought within a bounded region. Since Lewin defines ‘reality’ as 
‘what has effects’ (Lewin, 1936: 19), then it is the capacity to be affected through 
a relationship to some other person or thing that is of central relevance to life 
space. Affect, defined as the felt sense of the possibilities afforded within a 
relationship, then becomes another key analytic concern.  
 
For example, in our work in medium-secure forensic psychiatric units, an 
important question has been where the limit of the life space of a patient is to be 
found (Brown and Reavey, 2016). In purely physical terms, we may be led to 
think that this is with the imposing walls and security measures that prevent 
patients from leaving the hospital wards. These physical limits are important, 
and patients often prefer to be located in wards and bedroom where it is 
possible to see over the wall, particularly if there is a view that takes in natural 
features such as trees, or better yet extends beyond the immediate hospital 
grounds. Yet, in relational terms, walls and locked doors clearly do not define the 
capacity to be affected by others. Maintaining contact with a broader world 
through watching television or listening to the radio or recorded music are 
important aspects of life on the unit. Patients often try to retreat from the daily 
sounds and noise of the unit by creating their own ‘soundscapes’ of music in 
their bedrooms, which is typically described as being ‘transported’ elsewhere 
(Brown et al, forthcoming). Music then allows for an expansion of life space far 
beyond the physical limits of the built environment. 
 
The feeling of being elsewhere clearly involves memory. Whilst the description 
so far of life space seems focused on the current nature of relationships, Lewin 
clearly states that life space has a temporal structure:  
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It is important to realize that the psychological past and the psychological 
future are simultaneous parts of the psychological field existing at given 
time t. The time perspective is continually changing. According to field 
theory, any type of behaviour depends upon the total field, including the 
time perspective at that time (Lewin, 1997: 207) 
 
Life space extends into the past, as well as marking out the directions of the 
possible. We see remembering as accomplishing an expansion of life space. 
Insofar as it is possible to connect with past persons, objects or places, then they, 
in effect, part of what counts are current life space. And since all relations are 
defined by Lewin as ‘what has effects’, then the mobilisation of the past 
intertwines it within contemporaneous relations. We saw this earlier in the 
example of adoptive families, where past carers, mediated through photographs 
or objects, maintain a spectral, yet real presence – i.e. having effects – within the 
relationship between child and adoptive parents. The expansion of life space 
through memory complicates the topological structuring of relations through a 
folding in past places, such as with the example of the survivor who has to 
negotiate the significance of the locked door for how she views her brother and 
accounts for his past actions. We view the expansion and contraction of life space 
through memory as analagous to diastolic and systolic movements which open 
up and then actualise possibilities for action. This gives us a working definition 
of what is meant by ‘agency’ – the capacity to expand our feelings across a broad 
range of relations along with the ability to act upon them.  
 
From the description so far, the interpretation we have made of Lewin’s life 
space draws out considerable ‘family resemblance’ to von Uexhüll’s umwelt. 
However, Lewin has a paired concept of ‘psychological ecology’ that supplements 
life space: 
 
Any type of group life occurs in a setting of certain limitations to what is 
and what is not possible, what might or might not happen. The 
nonpsychological factors of climate, of the law of the country or the 
organization are a frequent part of these ‘outside limitations’. The first 
analysis of the field is done from the point of view of ‘psychological 
ecology’: the psychologist studies ‘nonpsychological’ data to find the 
boundary conditions of the life of the individual or group. Only after these 
data are known can the psychological study itself be begun to investigate 
the factors which determine the actions of the group or the individual in 
those situations which have been shown to be significant (Lewin, 1997: 
289) 
 
Psychological ecology refers to the broader social, economic and environmental 
forces at play, which serve as the grounds upon which life space emerges. For 
Lewin, this ground is ultimately a ‘constellation of forces’ which act together to 
create ‘quasi-stationary’ psychological and cultural patterns, such as ‘habits’ or 
‘preferences’. Whilst this distinction has the virtue of demonstrating that there is 
a contextual relationship, where broader forces impinge upon and shape the 
psychological, it does create an awkward dualism between two levels of analysis 
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– the personal psychological world of life space and the impersonal non-
psychological world of the socio-material environment.  
 
We propose to replace this distinction in Lewin with one drawn instead from 
Simondon (1992). The central concept in Simondon’s work is ‘individuation’. 
From a process perspective, Simondon argues that we cannot understand the 
emergence of an individual – whether that be a person, an organism, a collective 
or a techical device – outside of the specific processes of its constitution, since 
the constituted ‘individual’ usually does not resemble the materials involved in 
its constitution. Moreover, Simondon argues, we must not fall into the trap of 
imagining that the form the individual takes is somehow impressed upon matter 
(a position he disparages as Aristotelian hylomorphic theory), since this merely 
raises the further problem of how these forms emerge. Simondon speaks instead 
of indivuation as an ongoing process whereby elements affect and modulate one 
another such that new forms emerge - a process of ‘in-formation’.  
 
One of Simondon’s key examples is that of the development of crystals. These 
initially exist as an array of elements in a ‘supersaturated’ milieu of materials. On 
the basis of an initial energetic push, the crystal develops – or becomes – by 
exploiting the potentials of this milieu to propogate new forms throughout the 
milieu, a process that Simondon (1992) calls ‘transduction’. The resultant 
constituted crystal is then individualised from this initial milieu. We can see the 
dynamics of life space described by Lewin in a similar way. The person acts 
through being affected by and affecting (or ‘modulating’) the relationships in the 
psychological milieu in which they dwell. This reciprocal action propogates and 
transforms the person as part of a continuous process of individuation or 
becoming. But the same also holds for the relationships that make up Lewin’s 
‘psychological ecology’. Simondon speaks of a ‘preindividual’ milieu as the 
metastable ‘psychosocial’ environment out of which human individuation occurs. 
The preindividual milieu is never exhausted, it remains immanent to the 
development or lifecourse of the person. We may then say that for analytic 
purposes, life space is already a part of a broader psychosocial plane of 
transductive relationships that is carried forward into our actions. 
 
In the forensic psychiatric unit, for example, the movements and activities of 
patients are subject to monitoring designed to reduce ‘risk to self, others and 
environment’ (Barker, 2012). The idea of ‘risk’ belongs to a broader political 
discourse and set of social policy decisions that have a long history. These 
constitute the preindividual, psychosocial milieu, in that they operate beyond the 
lives of any given patient. By this milieu is not somewhere else – it is part of the 
daily lives of patients. It is written into the design of the building, it ‘in-forms’ the 
designs of chairs, toilets and seclusion rooms. It works its way into how patients 
feel about themselves and what they are prepared to say about their personal 
history to staff and fellow patients. Risk becomes an omipresent transductive 
movement that propogates throughout the unit and the broader care and justice 
systems within which it sits. The psychosocial milieu is, therefore, immanent to 
rather than outside of lifespace, without being reducible to it. Or put slightly 
differently, through remembering we articulate a broader socio-historical milieu 
through the complex ways in which it has ‘in-formed’ our experiences.  
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Setting Specificity 
 
The second major analytic tool that we draw upon is ‘setting specificity’. What 
we mean by this is the claim that remembering – what we can do with our 
memories – is dependent on the spaces where they are articulated, and, to a 
lesser extent, on the places entwined in the remembered experience. It is 
relatively well established that autobiographical remembering is not a ‘hard-
wired’ capacity, but rather a developmental skill that emerges through ongoing 
tutoring and scaffolding by care-givers (see Fivush et al, 2011). Indeed, the very 
idea that our memories ‘belong’ in some sense uniquely to us, and constitute the 
basis of our identity, has its own specific cultural and historical formation 
(Danziger, 2008). This would make autobiographical remembering one of the 
many ‘higher order’ cognitive properties described by Vygotsky (1978), which 
begin as publically rehearsed interactional processes before being ‘owned’ as 
seemingly private mental processes.  
 
From the perspective of phenomenologically informed variants of enactive 
cognition, this privatization of remembering is problematic. The others with 
whom we interact are not merely the means by which cognitive properties are 
acquired, they remain fundamental to their ongoing constitution and exercise, to 
the point where we can speak of autobiographical remembering as depending on 
intertwining of embodied subjects through inter-bodily resonance – i.e. an 
‘extended body’ (Froese & Fuchs, 2012). We are entirely in agreement with the 
thrust of this argument, with the caveat that we treat the resonances that tie 
bodies to one another as topologically distributed across life space, such that 
spatial (and even temporal) proximity is not necessarily required. But we also 
see other features of the environment as constituting ‘embodied extensions’. For 
example, photographs and diaries, formal records and even specific objects, such 
as the door handle in the previous example. Rather than treat these ‘things’ as 
external resources within a distributed cognition framework, we view them 
instead as part of a relational field that encompasses the persons who interact 
with them. Taken together, inter-subjective and inter-objective relations 
constitute a setting that has specific higher-order memorial properties. 
 
Consider, for instance, Ed Hutchin’s (1995) classic study of navigation aboard the 
naval ship Palau. Hutchins describes the entrainment of sailors with the charts 
and devices that structure their environment with exquisite detail. Insofar as one 
can speak of navigation as a matter of cognitive skill then it is one, he observes, 
where: 
 
a good deal of the expertise in the system is in the artifacts (both the 
external implements and the internal strategies) – not in the sense that 
the artifacts are themselves intelligent or expert agents, or because the 
act of getting into coordination with the artifacts constitutes an expert 
performance by the person; rather, the system of person-in-interaction-
with-technology exhibits expertise. These tools permit the people using 
 10 
them to do the tasks that need to be done while doing the kinds of things 
the people are good at: recognizing patterns, modeling simple dynamics 
of the world, and manipulating objects in the environment. (Hutchins, 
1995: 155) 
 
Hutchins claims here that tools enable the relatively low-level embodied 
cognitive skills of the sailors to become embedded in a broader system which has 
navigation as a supervenient higher order cognitive property. It is the system 
which has the expertise, rather than any of its individual parts. However, 
Hutchins remains within a traditional cognitive framework when he asserts that 
the basis of this system is the ‘propogation of representational states’. Here, we 
would side with the enactive cognition position that representation is not the 
central issue. What is at stake instead is how the system – the Palau – brings 
forth a ‘navigable world’ through its reciprocal interaction with the environment 
(e.g. waves, wind, landmass). When Hutchins describes an astrolabe, for instance, 
he sees this mechanical device for plotting movement in relation to astral 
positions as an ‘analog computer’ which serves as ‘externalised memory’, 
thereby reducing cognitive load on the user (who does not have the remember 
the position of planets and stars). But we may instead treat this device as the 
relational means by which otherwise remote features of the environment 
become part of the relational nexus formed around the Palau. The astrolabe does 
not ‘represent’ stars and planets, it mediates a relationship to them in such a way 
that despite their immense distance, they are relationally entwined within its 
navigational field. As Michel Serres (1995) once described in a discussion of the 
origins of this kind of technology in the early gnomon (e.g. a basic sundial) what 
the tool does is not to produce descriptions about the world, but rather translates 
properties of the world such that they become tractable features of the 
experiential world. John Law draws upon this insight in his study of Portuguese 
15th centrury imperial navigation by proposing that new technical arrangements 
enabled the Portguese fleet to create navigational field which ‘include[d] the 
very heavens, heavens that stayed with the navigator wherever he might go’ 
(Law, 1986). The stars became part of the ‘network’ built by Portuguese 
expansion, not mere representations.  
 
Turning back to autobiographical remembering, we see inter-objective relations 
between persons and things as critical to the capacity to mobilise past events in 
the present. In a study of a reminiscence museum based in a care home for 
elderly clients in the Netherlands (Bendien, 2010; Bendien et al, 2010), we 
observed numerous instances where elderly persons were able to engage in 
recollections of difficult events from their childhood and early adulthood in 
course of interacting with very specific objects. A certain room in particular in 
the museum, which had been made over to resemble a Dutch kitchen from the 
first half of the twentieth century, seemed to invoke such memories regularly. 
One woman told a complex narrative, which weaved between her early 
experiences as a mother caring for her son and his more recent death as an adult, 
centred around a rather unsafe looking washing device, and its exposed 
machinery. Other woman told stories of childhood hardship and resilience 
focused on large bath tubs, originally used for hand transporting boiling water 
from the ground floor pump up the stairs of pre-war apartment blocks. These are 
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‘body memories’ in the sense that they refer to long ingrained bodily 
comportments and feelings (see Fuchs, 2012), but they require the relationship 
to these specific objects in order to be properly articulated. These ‘setting 
specific’ instances of autobiographical remembering are then, properly speaking, 
emergent properties of the combination of persons who share a communicative 
memorial relationship to a specific place (i.e. Rotterdam in immediate pre- and 
post- war era) with a very particular range of objects. It is the setting, or the 
‘memorial field’, of persons, place and objects that does the remembering. 
 
Treating objects not as mere stimuli, but as relational parts of the setting which 
affords remembering offers some challenges. Memory feels like it ought to 
belong on the human side of a subject-object distinction. However, Simondon is 
once again instructive on this point. He argues that the distinction between 
human and ‘technical objects’ masks a deeper intimacy between persons and 
tools. Invention – the capacity to realise potentials in the organism’s relationship 
to the environment – is of the essence of technicity (Simondon, 2012). In this 
sense, the inventive power of tools to realise new relationships to the 
environment defines hummanness every bit as well as any other candidate 
attribute. Given this intertwining of the human and the technical object, 
Simondon suggests that an adequate analysis of human actions (such as 
remembering) needs to ‘tend toward a phenomenology of regimes of activity, 
without an ontological presupposition that is relative to the nature of that which 
enters into the activity’ (2009: 18). In other words, much as with Gregory 
Bateson’s (1973) parable of the blind man’s stick, we should proceed through a 
description of what is experienced at the level of system that is engaged in the 
activity rather than concern ourselves with prior and premature demarcations 
about the ontological status of what affords that activity. 
 
A setting might then be also described as a ‘world’ – a set of entangled relations 
that have their own affordances and constraints, and which is endowed with its 
particular historicity and potentials. It makes no sense to understand 
autobiographical remembering as the abstract act of recollecting past events 
since, as Maria Puig de la Bellacasa (2012: 212) puts it ‘nothing comes without 
its world, we do not encounter single individuals, a meeting produces a world, 
changes the colour of things, it diffracts more than reflects’. We remember from 
within a world, or, more properly, with and through a world that makes that 
remembering possible. 
 
To summarise briefly: our argument began with the claim that we need to 
examine how embodied relations to others, things and features of place are 
implicated in remembering. Having qualified our interest in remembering 
difficult or problematic events (‘vital memory’), we then turned towards the field 
theory of Kurt Lewin to build upon his idea of the topological organization of 
experience, extending across time and space. Here remembering can be treated 
as an expansion or contraction of life space, and attendant possibilities for action. 
We have now added the notion that remembering is itself an emergent property 
of situated inter-subjective and inter-objective relations, that constitute the 
world in which memories are enacted. Thus equipped, we now in a position to 
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turn to our central point – that the body does not constitute a singular unity that 
carries memory.  
 
The Plurality of Body Memory 
 
Froese and Fuchs (2012) describe how the ‘extended body’ is constituted 
through a ‘resonance’ between individual bodies. This is a process that involves 
the expression of bodily feelings that impress themselves upon another in such a 
way that they give rise to a new reciprocal expression. In this way, two bodies 
become ‘parts of a dynamic sensori-motor and inter-affective system that 
connects both bodies by reciprocal movements and reactions’ resulting in ‘inter-
bodily resonance’ (2012: 213). This definition of resonance limits relations 
between bodies to organic beings that can respond to one another. However, if 
we take seriously Simondon’s injunction to begin phenomenological description 
of ‘regimes of activity’ without apportioning ontological distinctions, we can see 
that a reciprocal shaping or in-forming, where differences in one part of the field 
result in differences in another, occurs between people and things. Simondon 
(1992) uses the term ‘modulation’ to refer to the form-giving loop where 
‘differences make a difference’ (cf. Bateson, 1972). Some examples of modulation 
in a memorial field might include the following: processes of modification or 
wearing down, such as the stretching or tearing of clothing, which acts as a sign 
of particular experiences; processes of reframing and reconfiguration, such as the 
circulation of images in social media, which attract tagging and commenting, 
transforming the memorial potentials of the initial image; processes of 
modification and restructuring of operations, such as the adjustments made a car 
seat or the layout of computer desktop, which ‘act back’ to reorganize routines 
and activities and become emblematic of a personal history; processes of 
disconnection and reconnection, such as the loss felt over the disappearance of 
particular object and the restoration of a past world that is felt when a once-
familiar object is re-encountered. 
 
Resonance may then be seen as a particular instance of the more general 
category of modulation, or reciprocal form-giving, that characterizes the activity 
of any given field. From this it follows that relationships to objects and tools are 
not merely ‘additions’ to the body in such a way as to simply augment some 
existing bodily capacity, but tend to either restructure those capacities or 
actualize potentials that were not otherwise apparent. For example, the ability to 
feel that one is emotionally affected and transported elsewhere through the 
experience of listening to music is not clearly grounded in any particular pre-
existing embodied skill. Rather, the experience recruits a range of personal 
abilities and dispositions in tandem with the qualities of music to constitute a 
novel affective movement. Yet the experience of being taken elsewhere that 
arises through such listening is no more ‘in’ the body than it is ‘in’ the music. The 
listener and the sound form what Simondon (2009) calls an ‘operative solidarity’ 
– a unity arising through participation in realization of a potential that emerges 
through their relationship. Once realized, this potential (i.e. for being 
transported) will come to seem as though it is always pre-existed its emergence 
– a tendency that A.N. Whitehead once termed rendering ‘the future as anterior 
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to the present’ (1933). In this way, bodily extensions or inter-objective relations 
within the extended body, come to appear as naturalized.  
 
If the extended body forms an ‘operative solidarity’ with relational-material 
extensions, then to what extent can we say, with Fuchs, that ‘our entire 
personality is based on the memory of the body’ (2012: 15)? Fuchs’ argument is 
premised on the view of a continuity of lived experience grounded in a 
‘historically formed body whose experiences have left their traces in its invisible 
dispositions’ which ‘permeate the environment like an invisible net that spreads 
out from its senses and limbs, connects us with the world and render it familiar 
to us (2012: 20). However, these dispositions also emerge, in part, within what 
Fuchs calls ‘intercorporeal’ or ‘inter-bodily’ memory, which is grounded in turn 
on the ‘pre-reflective lived inter-bodily reciprocity’ manifest in the extended 
body (Froese & Fuchs, 2012: 214). Whilst the individual body may bear traces of 
such memories, in an important sense they do not subsume all of the memory, 
because it is constituted within the relation itself. Indeed, several of the examples 
that Fuchs gives, such as the experience of recovering prior ways of comporting 
ourselves when returning to places we have known, the pianist directing herself 
to the music as she strikes the keys, or Proust’s narrator famously feeling 
Combray unfold origami-like from supped madeleine-infused tea, all suggest that 
there is a reciprocal ‘in-forming’ of memory through the relationship to objects 
and place.  
 
How might we instead see ‘body memory’ not as grounded solely in an individual 
body but as instead within its inter-subjective and inter-objective relations? The 
work of the anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro provides some guidance. 
Viveiros de Castro, whose ethnographic work has been in Brazil with Amerindian 
communities, is best known for his advocacy of ‘multinaturalism’ as means of 
avoiding cultural relativism (2016). As a discipline, anthropology has made a 
shift from treating the practice and beliefs systems on non-Western peoples as 
exceptional and exotic in comparison to the supposed cognitive norms of the 
West, toward the reversed position of treating ‘animist’ and ‘totemist’ culture as 
superior in their ecological concerns with Nature in comparison with the 
destructive metaphysical dualisms of the Occident. In this sense, contemporary 
anthropological work is often cited in support of phenomenological and critical 
psychological critiques of overly ‘brain-bound’ versions of cognitive science (e.g 
Cromby, 2015). But Viveiros de Castro argues that cultural relativism remains 
committed to a representationalist dogma, where what is stake is how different 
cultures view the same natural world through different lenses. Here nature is a 
stable given, with culture varying its representational content.  
 
Drawing on a large body of ethnographic work conducted across North and 
South America, Viveiros de Castro (2016) describes how the category of ‘human’ 
is applied to all living creatures in the majority of Amerindian cosmologies. 
Although plants and animals have different physical forms to people, they are, in 
their essence ‘human’. This means that the lives of living creatures are taken to 
have a similar form of social organization, based around kinship networks, 
homes and hunting and gathering practices etc. Culture is then a static given 
shared by humans, animals and even plants in pretty much the same way. But 
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what differs radically is the natural world, which is entirely a matter of the 
perspective that is relative from the physical form ‘humanness’ takes:  
 
in normal conditions, humans see humans as humans and animals as 
animals; as to spirits, to see these usually invisible beings is a sure sign 
that the “conditions” are not normal. Animals (predators) and spirits, 
however, see humans as animals (as prey), to the same extent that 
animals (as prey) see humans as spirits or as animals (predators). By the 
same token, animals and spirits see themselves as humans: they perceive 
themselves as (or become) anthropomorphic beings when they are in 
their own houses or villages and they experience their own habits and 
characteristics in the form of culture—they see their food as human food 
(jaguars see blood as manioc beer, vultures see the maggots in rotting 
meat as grilled fish etc.), they see their bodily attributes (fur, feathers, 
claws, beaks) as body decorations or cultural instruments, they see their 
social system as organised in the same way as human institutions are 
(with chiefs, shamans, ceremonies, exogamous moieties etc.) (Viveiros de 
Castro, 2016: 47-48) 
 
Perspective – the way that we are disposed toward the world, the possibilities 
for thinking, feeling and acting that are disclosed by that world – is entirely a 
matter of ‘nature’ rather than ‘culture’ in Amerindian cosmologies. If people and 
animals are different, it is not because they think or live differently, but instead 
because their bodies, their physical form, affords them a perspective on the 
world that distributes humanness into different orders from each other. In this 
way, Viveiros de Castro claims, the Amerindian world has but one culture and 
many natures. Shifting perspectives requires a transformation in physical form. 
Hence, shamans and other venerated persons are able to alter themselves into 
animals or objects in order to gain knowledge that would not be otherwise 
available from the ‘human’ perspective (e.g. a shaman becomes a rope because 
this offers a useful perspective on a person’s sickness that would not be possible 
when in human form). Crucially, Viveiros de Castro argues that such shifts in 
perspective are not simply different ways of seeing the world. Moving between 
‘natures’ means taking up a position in a set of terms are defined in relation to 
one another. We typically find such relations in closed structures such as kinship 
networks, where a term such a ‘nephew’ has a definite deictic function in 
association with the term ‘uncle’, such that one term acts as a ‘relational pointer’ 
to the other. By contrast, a term such as ‘fish’ or ‘snake’ refers to the substantive 
characteristics of some entity beyond any relations they might enter into. But 
because culture is static in Amerindian cosmology, all substantive terms are 
actually relative – a ‘fish’ is only a ‘fish’ for someone (or something). There are no 
static ‘substances’, only relationally defined physical beings:  
 
[I]f saying that crickets are the fish of the dead or that mud is the 
hammock of tapirs is like saying that Isabel’s son Michael is my nephew, 
then there is no “relativism” involved. Isabel is not a mother “for” Michael, 
from Michael’s “point of view” in the usual, relativist-subjectivist sense of 
the expression: she is the mother of Michael, she’s really and objectively 
Michael’s mother, and I am really Michael’s uncle. This is a genitive, 
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internal relation—my sister is the mother of someone, our cricket the fish 
of someone—not a representational, external connection of the type “X is 
fish for someone,” which implies that X is “represented” as fish, whatever 
X is “in itself.” (Viveiros de Castro, 2016: 110) 
 
To move between perspectives is to take a different embodied standpoint. Mud is 
not ‘seen as’ or ‘thought as’ a hammock by tapirs; it has instead a ‘real’ relational 
standing as such within their embodied perspective in much the same way that 
the terms ‘tomorrow’ and ‘today’ are not subjectively defined but rather change 
their deictic status according to temporal standpoint. That is to say that a 
‘standpoint is not an opinion or a construction; there is nothing “subjective,” in 
the usual sense of the term, in the concepts of “yesterday” and “tomorrow,” or of 
“my mother” and “your brother”—they are objectively relative or relational 
concepts. The actual world of other species depends on their specific standpoint’ 
(Viveiros de Castro, 2016: 110). 
 
Returning now to ‘body memory’, we can offer the following provocation. The 
idea that the body is a repository for traces of specific social experiences and 
culturally derived preferences, styles and ways of being depends on the view 
that the body can act as a substance that is continuous over time and which can 
bear the impress of a variable and relative culture that is the source of our 
individual unique personality and life history. But what if this were reversed? It 
is the modulations and transformations of the body as it enters into ‘objectively 
relative’ relational standpoints with persons, things and places that constitute 
the warp and weft of experience. We do not have a single ‘living body’, but rather 
a plurality of relationally defined embodied experiences as we pass into different 
kinds of ‘operative solidarity’ with other persons and things. The living body is 
continuously becoming pluralized as it shifts between different relational 
configurations. Our past would not then be a settled series of memorial traces or 
a subjective record of things that have occurred, but rather a dynamically 
shifting set of relationships to the past that are operant within particular kinds of 
inter-subjective and inter-objective arrangement. The body memory of the 
pianist or the dancer, for example, is not preserved as such within the person 
concerned, but rather as a relational potential that is actualized when the living 
body is coupled with and extended by a piano or a dance partner. There is no 
such thing as a ‘great pianist’ or a ‘talented dancer’ – only persons who are 
capable of forming operative solidarities with things and people that will allow 
them to jointly constitute an extended living musical or rhythmic body in a world 
where such activities have meaning.  
 
As we have argued throughout, autobiographical memories are similarly 
‘objectively relative’ to the kinds of material relations in which we are placed. We 
do not remember particular events through being subjectively disposed to see 
the world in certain ways. Rather, we remember through the relationally defined 
positions that we are placed into through our encounters with others and things. 
To return again to an earlier example, the adult survivor does not struggle with 
issues of agency because of the subjective trauma of childhood sexual abuse. Her 
issue is instead that she is ‘dis-posed’ – i.e. relationally placed – to articulate 
what happened from the perspective of the locked door. It is the relationship to 
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the door that establishes the meaning of the abuse. No injunction to ‘think about 
it differently’ by finding other interpretations of the situation will erase the 
difficulty of the memory. Instead, we would tentatively suggest, that shifting the 
physical standpoint is required to change the meaning. If perspective comes 
from a relational configuration that constitutes a very particular lived body, then 
changing perspective a displacement into different set of inter-objective 
relations. Perhaps, as with Eco’s (1988) idea of ‘steganography’, the material 
shift of perspective might subsume or occlude aspects of the autobiographical 
memory – the locked door becomes embedded within the remembered 
architecture of the house – in ways that allow for a reformulation of the past. But 
in any case meaning is constituted within these extended material relations 
rather than a subjective impression we form of them. 
 
A 100% Relational Psychology 
 
Throughout this paper we have restated the claim that autobiographical 
remembering must be analysed with respect to the relationally constituted field 
in and through which it occurs. Remembering past events involves a topological 
reorganization, or folding together, of past and present relational-material space, 
which ‘individuates’ the lived body with respect to an emergent field of 
possibility. Yet if, following Clarke & Chalmers (1998), we find it difficult to say 
where exactly mind stops and the world begins, so we are similarly unable to 
state in advance exactly where the boundaries lie of the lived, extended body. In 
this respect we are pursuing an approach to the psychological that is, as Viveiros 
de Castro puts it, ‘100% relational’ (2016: 111).  
 
Our initial move has been to return to the notion of the lived field of experience – 
or ‘life space’ – theorized by Lewin (1936). Here persons are defined with 
respect to patterns of actual and psychological movement that are afforded 
within a topological structured series of relations. The lived body is, in this sense, 
co-extensive with a portion or region of life space, whose overall boundaries 
constitute the immediate psychological horizon. These boundaries, and the form 
of the space itself, are continually being reformulated through the work of 
remembering. Life space incorporates past and future in the form of ‘possibilities 
for action’, whose expansion or contraction grants a sense of agency.  
 
Lewin placed life space as one term in a dualism, along with the contrast term 
psychological ecology, this latter being the non-psychological material forces 
that shape and deform lived experience. Like all dualisms, this raises 
considerable difficulties as to how to think categorical relations between the 
terms – Is life space ‘contained within’ psychological ecology? How does a non-
psychological force express itself in psychological terms? At what point can we 
speak of one term stopping and the other starting? To avoid such difficulties, we 
have pursued the monist path marked out by Simondon of positing a broader, 
pre-individual psychosocial milieu that is immanent to life space. Put simply, for 
analytic purposes we treat social or political forces as having a real existence 
beyond life space, but one that we encounter as constituted within the inter-
subjective and inter-objective relations that become configured as life space. The 
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sociopolitical is not outside of our relationships – it is precisely the qualities and 
actions that emerge within them.  
 
The second term we have repeatedly used – setting specificity – is a device for 
describing practices and particular kinds of organized relations. Once again, we 
want to avoid placing this form of life as some kind of external context. We think 
of settings in terms of the affordances and contraints that emerge within life 
space, or the combinatorial possibilities for relations that can enter into 
‘operative solidarities’. There is, of course, a real building with walls, gates and 
wards, peopled with clinicians and patients, which makes up a psychiatric 
hospital. But it is experienced as a relational space of thinking, feeling and acting, 
and our phenomenological description of it as a ‘regime of activity’ needs to 
proceed through a relational mapping of what has effects, of the affective and 
practical possibilities that may be realized in this space. As a consequence, place 
itself, whether it be a hospital, a ship or a stretch of coastline, is not a site that 
contains persons, but rather a manifest set of relationships that together enact a 
world of very particular kind of experiences.  
 
We then arrive at a view of ‘body memory’ from a different direction to that of 
Fuchs (2012). The lived body is not merely extended to include the other 
persons with whom we interact, it is instead a shifting relational configuration – 
a smearing of affects and actions across life space. The body is not a singular 
constituted unity that travels through time and space, but rather a plurality of 
combinatorial relational possibilities that we actualize through the folding and 
unfolding of life space. In this sense, we do not think of body memory as 
assembling stored action-patterns that enable sense-making, but rather as a 
series of material-relational perspectives that are constituted through different 
operative solidarities. These perspectives may well involve contradictions – in 
fact our empirical work suggests that ambiguity and conflict arising from shifting 
relationally defined perspectives is the norm rather than the exception in 
remembering difficult events. The challenge then is to understand how we 
extract a sense of continuity out of this plurality of embodied experiences. 
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1 Deleuze is here offering a very particular interpretation of von Uexhüll that 
bears more detailed consideration than we can offer here. It should be noted that 
Deleuze’s semiotics are mixture of Hjemslev’s linguistics and Pierce’s triadic 
model and, as such, do not readily map onto a biosemiotic framework. In fact, 
Deleuze’s (1988) remarks about von Uexhüll appear within his reading of 
Spinoza’s ethics, where ‘expression’ has an ontological rather than analytical 
status. Thus questions of sense and meaning in Deleuze’s work are typically 
indexed to a broader concern with how ‘bodies’ and ‘language’ are co-assembled 
within a mileu. Sense, in particular, is treated as arising from the ordering of 
relations between bodies (where ‘body’ refers to a Spinozist basic ontological 
category of a composition of parts which have the capacity to be affected by 
other bodies). We thank one anonymous reviewer for pointing out the need for 
further qualification. 
